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I. INTRODUCTION
It is becoming increasingly difficult for a hospital to escape liability
for any acts of professional negligence occurring within its walls. Tra-
ditionally, hospitals have been held liable under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior for the negligent acts of their employees and agents.
But because non-employee physicians were considered independent
contractors, hospitals were not liable for their negligence absent spe-
cial circumstances.' The assault on the status of physicians as in-
dependent contractors has begun and is proceeding apace.2 Further,
the doctrines of ostensible agency3 and corporate negligence 4 have
* B.S.N., Georgetown University; M.S.N., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Univer-
sity of Maryland School of Law. Franch, Earnest & Cowdrey, Easton, Md.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law
1. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 45-89 and accompanying text.
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arisen as alternative bases for holding hospitals liable for the negligent
acts of non-employee physicians.
Moreover, steps taken by hospitals to minimize the likelihood of
liability under one of these theories often increase the likelihood of
liability under a different theory. For example, although hospitals
might develop stricter evaluation and selection controls for the grant-
ing and retention of staff privileges to avoid a finding of corporate neg-
ligence, attempts to control physicians' practice by review and
supervision increase the potential for a finding of agency.5 If the hos-
pital attempts to circumscribe its relationships with the physician by
contractual arrangements delineating the independence of the physi-
cian, this very instrument may be used to show either control or an
employer-employee relationship.6 Should the hospital attempt no su-
pervision over the physician, it may be in violation of accreditation
requirements7 for the monitoring of medical practice within its walls
and, therefore, negligent under a corporate responsibility theory.8
The difficulty of escaping liability has proven so great that it has
been recommended that hospitals accept the inevitable, expect liabil-
ity for the torts of their independent contractors, insure themselves
for that eventuality, and establish indemnification agreements be-
tween the physicians' and hospitals' carriers.9
This Article explores some of the problems hospitals face in avoid-
ing liability for the negligence of their independent contractors. After
a critical analysis of the theories underlying imposition of liability, we
discuss the sometimes conflicting public policy considerations respect-
ing the mandates given to the modern hospital as these mandates af-
fect hospitals' liability.
II. EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM
Hospitals were originated by religious and military orders in medi-
eval times.' 0 Plagues were rampant, life expectancies short, and any
care was better than no care. Hospitals continued under the control of
religious orders and governmental agencies and, in more modern
4. See infra notes 91-133 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 93-95.
6. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
7. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, I to V ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, MEDICAL STAFF STANDARDS 89-104 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as JCAH STANDARDS]. The Commission shall be hereinafter cited as JCAH;
the Manual as AMH.
8. See infra notes 91-134 and accompanying text.
9. Southwick, Hospital Liability: Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEGAL MED.
1, 49 (1983).
10. For example, the Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul and the Sisters of
Knight Hospitallers of St. John (also known as the Knights of Malta) established
hospitals. See generally J. DOLAN, HISTORY OF NURSING (1968).
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times, charitable"l and governmental 12 immunity arose, precluding
suit or greatly limiting recovery.
The emergence of liability insurance, the replacement of The Lit-
tle Sisters of the Poor by proprietary secular hospital corporations, the
inconsistencies among jurisdictions, and the belief that stare decisis
should not be an excuse to justify unfair laws have caused legisla-
tures13 and courts14 to abolish or reduce the impact of immunities.' 5
The end result is a less sympathetic target with a much deeper pocket
for potential litigation.
Concomitant with the change in the legal climate was a change in
the relationships among hospitals, patients, and physicians. Health
care is "big business" in the United States, and hospitals are run in-
creasingly for profit by large national health corporations.16 Hospital
11. Charitable immunity was first pronounced in the United States in McDonald v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876). The Massachusetts court relied
upon the English case Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C.B. (N.S.) 192, 142 Eng. Rep.
769 (1861), which, apparently unknown to the Massachusetts court, had been
overruled by Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L.R. 11 H.L.C. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866),
and Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, 6 L.R.-Q.B. 214 (1871). Nevertheless, other
jurisdictions in the United States accepted the doctrine with full knowledge of
the English repudiation. Prior to 1942 most jurisdictions adhered to charitable
immunity at least in part. For a discussion of the pre-1942 status of charitable
immunity, see President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130
F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
12. The hospitals of both federal and state governments were historically immune
from suit under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. This was incor-
porated into American law at an early date, seemingly without much considera-
tion as to whether it was appropriate for a republic. A justification for its
reception was offered by Justice Holmes in Kawanakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S.
349,353 (1907). For a detailed exposition of the historical origins of governmental
immunity, see Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pts. 7 & 8), 28
COLUM. L. REv. 577, 734 (1928), noted in J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE
ToRTs PROcEss 620 (2d ed.) (1981); Borchard, Governmental Repsonsibility in
Tort, (pts. 4-6), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27); Borchard, Government Liabil-
ity in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25).
13. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWs ch. 231 § 85K (West Supp. 1984-85); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41.480 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.53A-8 (West Supp. 1984-85); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1.539-9 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-26 (1969).
14. E.g., President and Doctors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Tuengel v. City of Sitka, 118 F. Supp. 399 (D. Alaska 1954); Malloy v.
Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951). By 1982 over 30 jurisdictions had abro-
gated the doctrine of charitable immunity.
15. Governmental immunities have been slower to be abrogated. Legislation such as
the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976), §§ 2671-2680
(1982)) is an example of the trend toward allowing suits in tort under certain
circumstances against governmental hospitals.
16. By 1979, 10 percent of all hospitals were run for profit. P. JosKow, CONTROLLING
HOsPITAL CosTS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMNT REGULATION 6 (1981). Since 1979,
large health care coporations such as Humana and Health Care Corporation of
America, and various Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's), such as the
Kaiser Plan hospitals, have increased their numbers of facilities by both construc-
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services are depersonalized and consumers feel no special reverence
for the hospital or its employees. The depersonalization of the patient
within the institution was an inevitable result of the dehumanization
of the hospital. Health care is an industry subject to cost-controls,17
governmental regulation,18 job actions,19 and, frequently, malpractice
suits.
Not only hospital care but medical care generally is more special-
ized and less personal than in the past. The concept of the single phy-
sician caring for the entire family, making house calls, and becoming a
friend of the family to be called on in any emergency is no longer com-
mon.20 Patients look increasingly to the hospital to provide primary
medical care. Often they have no personal physician,21 or, if they do,
that physician merely admits them to the hospital for specialized care.
At least one court has found that patients expect the hospital to cure
them.22 They rely on the hospital to provide good care and any doctor
with whom they come in contact at the hospital is presumed to be the
hospital's agent.
As technology advances increased specialization is inevitable. In-
deed, to qualify for government funds hospitals are required to pro-
tion and purchase of existing hospitals. Lecture, Health Care Law, Carl
Schramm, Univ. of Md. (Oct. 11, 1984).
17. For a good general discussion of traditional and newer cost control measures, see
D. SALKEVER & T. BICE, HOSPITAL CERTIFICATE OF NEED CONTROLS: IMPACT ON
INVESTMENT, COSTS AND USE (1979); D. SALKEVER & T. BICE, PROPOSALS FOR
REGULATION OF HOSPITAL COSTS (1978).
18. E.g., National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-641, §§ 1521(2)(c)(4)(d), 1523, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (creating the Health Sys-
tems Agencies); Medicare Program: Prospective Payment for Medicare Inpatient
Hospital Services, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752 (1983) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405,
409, 489) (establishing "DRG" (Diagnostically Related Group) prospective pay-
ment for all Medicare payments). For a good general discussion of governmental
regulation, see H. AARON & W. ScHwARTz, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATION-
ING HosPrrAL CARE (1984); P. JOSKOW, supra note 16; M. STRICKLER & F. BAL-
LARD, REPRESENTING HEALTH CARE FACILITIES (1981). For a comprehensive
legal analysis of Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO's), see Hav-
ighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The
Role of PSRO's, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6 (1975); Note, Federally Imposed Sef-Regula-
tion of Medical Practice: A Critique of the Professional Standards Review Organ-
ization, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 822 (1974).
19. For a discussion of the extension of federal labor legislation to hospitals, see
ASPEN SYSTEMS CORPORATION, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAw 91-101 (1968).
20. The emergence of the board certified Family Practitioner as a specialist in his
own right is but one reaction to this depersonalization. While the number of fam-
ily practitioners is increasing, especially in rural areas, the more personal aspects
of health care services such as house calls have not been repopularized. AMERI-
CAN BOARD OF FAMILY PRACTITIONERS, ANN. REP. (1979).
21. It is estimated that, in 1984, 60 percent of American citizens had no personal phy-
sician. Schram lecture, supra note 16.
22. See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11
(1957).
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vide certain services and may be prohibited from providing others,
depending on regional need and supply.23 To be cost effective and to
guarantee services, hospitals execute exclusive service contracts with
groups of independent contractor physicians to staff clinical areas,
such as radiology, pathology, and emergency room service, which must
be available on a twenty-four hour basis.24 Consequently, patients'
ability to select physicians becomes limited by the restriction of
clinical practice to contracting physicians. Finally, expansion of serv-
ices, introduction of medical sub-specialities,2 5 and the requirements
of governmental and accrediting agencies 26 force hospitals to establish
a complicated framework of review committees 27 to monitor the qual-
ity of care provided.
Thus, hospitals serve as employers, contractors, and evaluators.
Each of these roles has spawned a theory of liability for patients who
rely on the hospital to provide adequate, safe, and comprehensive
medical care. The hospital as employer suggests the respondeat supe-
rior theory of liability. As contractor, the hospital may be subject to
liability for the acts of contracting physicians who, while not employ-
ees, may be viewed as apparent or ostensible agents for the purpose of
establishing the hospital's liability. As evaluator, the hospital may be
subject to liability for corporate negligence should the evaluation pro-
cess go awry. The law assumes that the average person is not medi-
cally sophisticated or knowledgeable and that he places his fate in the
23. Regional Health Services Agencies may issue "certificates of need" based on cost,
demographic data, and availability of services. See supra note 18. For a sympo-
sium on the subject, see Symposium. Certificate-of-Need Laws in Health Plan-
ning, 1978 UTAH L. REv., 1-210 (1978). See also Havighurst, Regulation of Health
Facilities and Serices by "CertiAate of Need," 59 VA. L. REV. 1143 (1973);
Schonbrun, Making Certificate of Need Work, 57 N.C.L. REv. 1259 (1979). For a
review of various state certificate of need legislation, see CHAYET & SON-
NENREICH, CERTIFICATE OF NEED: AN EXPANDING REGuLATORY CONCEPT 155-944
(1978).
24. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (legality of a
kind of tying arrangement contract for anesthesia services).
25. As of 1978 the American Board of Medical Specialities recognized the following
specialities as members: Allergy and Immunology; Anesthesiology; Colon and
Rectal Surgery; Dermatology; Family Practice; Internal Medicine; Neurological
Surgery; Nuclear Medicine; Obstetrics and Gynecology;, Ophthalmology;, Orthope-
dic Surgery; Otolaryngology; Pathology;, Pediatrics; Physical Medicine and Reha-
bilitation; Plastic Surgery; Preventive Medicine; Psychiatry and Neurology;
Radiology; Surgery, Thoracic Surgery;, and Urology. There were numerous spe-
cial certifications within some of these basic groups, particularly Internal
Medicine, Pathology, and Pediatrics. For a detailed history of specialization and
the development of specialty boards, see R. STEVENs, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREsT (1971).
26. See JCAH STANDARDS, supra note 7.
27. See generally Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Sta-
tus, 1 AM. J.L. & MED. 245, 248 (1975).
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care of the hospital and those who practice within it.28 For these rea-
sons, among others, hospital liability is expanding.
III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
A. Respondeat Superior
The liability of hospitals for the torts committed by their employee
nurses and physicians is a relatively recent phenomenon. 29 In 1914, in
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,o the court held that a
hospital corporation could not be licensed to practice medicine, and,
therefore, could not direct the activities of licensed professionals. If
the doctors and nurses were independent contractors not subject to
control, the hospital could not be liable under the theory of respon-
deat superior even if these professionals were salaried.31
Unable to recover against the hospital, creative plaintiffs fictional-
ized a distinction between "administrative" and "medical" acts. Thus,
for example, a nurse scheduling staff hours would be performing an
administrative act, but her bedside patient care would constitute a
medical act. Hospitals were liable for an employee physician's admin-
istrative acts because no medical judgment was involved. In Bing v.
Thunig,32 the court obliterated this distinction, holding hospitals lia-
ble for the professional actions of its salaried employees. The court
noted the changing role of the hospital, stating that hospitals were
more than just facilities where professionals practiced. They em-
ployed large numbers of nurses and billed for their services routinely.
They undertook to "cure" patients using their professional staff mem-
bers. Therefore, they should not expect an exemption from general
principles of liability.33 The Bing rule won widespread acceptance, 34
with one court holding payment of even a part-time salary sufficient
to trigger application of the doctrine. 35
28. Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 169 N.J. Super. 575, 405 A.2d 443 (1979); Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
29. See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957) (over-
ruling Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92
(1914)).
30. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
31. While technically correct in its interpretation of medical and nursing practice
acts, the exception to the theory created by this decision was not necessary in
light of actual supervisory practice. Hospitals typically employ nurses and physi-
cians to supervise the practice of independent contractor nurses and physicians.
In such instances the hospital is not directing professional practice; its profes-
sional employees are doing so.
32. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957).
33. Id.
34. Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practice, 1979
SPEcIALTY DIG: HEALTH CARE 5, 6.
35. Niles v. San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974), noted in
Southwick, supra note 9, at 8.
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An assertion of liability based on respondeat superior charges the
hospital with vicarious liability, not direct negligence. Theoretically,
imposition of liability is justified by the hospital's right to control its
employees.36 Existence of control allows the institution to take reme-
dial action to tighten supervisory procedures, thus theoretically les-
sening the likelihood of the recurrence of a similiar negligent act.
Because respondeat superior traditionally has been limited in applica-
tion to employees or other agents and based on the employer's (princi-
pal's) right to control the work, it should follow that a hospital would
not be liable for the negligence of an independent contractor who, un-
like the salaried employee, has sole control over his work methods.37
Nonetheless, Mduba v. Benedictine Hospital,3 8 held that the general
guidelines established by a hospital's rules, bylaws, and regulations
constitute control sufficient to establish an employer-employee rela-
tionship. In Mduba, because it controlled his practice through such
bylaws, rules and regulations, the hospital was held vicariously liable
for the negligence of a non-employee (independent contractor) physi-
cian providing services in its emergency room.
Plaintiff's decedent, a victim of an automobile accident, was
brought to Benedictine Hospital's emergency room where she was
treated by Dr. Bitash, the physician covering the emergency depart-
ment. Although the exact nature of Dr. Bitash's treatment of the de-
cedent is not documented, it appears that he failed to obtain a sample
of plaintiff's blood for the purpose of matching it with blood available
for transfusion. When her private physician arrived he was unable to
obtain the blood sample. By the time an anesthesiologist was able to
get the sample and the transfusion was begun, the decedent was in
irreversible hypovolemic shockS9 and died despite any further resusci-
tative attempts.40 The medicolegal inference was that Bitash could
have obtained blood from decedent, and that his failure to do so in a
timely fashion in compliance with accepted standards of medical care
deprived her of her last chance for life.
36. Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 207 So. 2d 235, 242 (La. App. 1968); Principles of Hospi-
tal Liability, § 2, HosPrrAL LAW MANUAL, Health Law Center, Aspen Systems
Corp. at 7 (1972); Galatz, Hospital Liability: The Institution, the Physician, the
Staff, 20 TRIAL 64 (May 1984); Southwick, supra note 9, at 4.
37. See generally Slawkowski, supra note 34; Southwick, supra note 9.
38. 384 N.Y.S. 2d 527, 52 A.D.2d 450 (1976).
39. Hypovolemic shock results from the loss of so much blood volume that vital body
organs are deprived of adequate circulation and cease to function. Certain organs
automatically shut down some of their function to protect themselves from vol-
ume depletion. Other organs require a specified volume to function and are irre-
versibly damaged by prolonged or even transient volume depletion.
Physiologically, if too much blood volume is lost, the pressure in the vessel de-
creases until the sides of the vessel walls collapse and venipuncture becomes im-
possible. A. GuYTON, FUNCTION OF THE HUmAN BODY 175 (1969).
40. Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 528, 52 A.D.2d 450, 451 (1976).
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Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against Benedictine, con-
tending that the hospital did not provide the blood soon enough to
prevent the decedent from going into irreversible shock. The trial
court, on a showing of the contract between Benedictine and Bitash,
dismissed the complaint against the hospital based on the absence of
an employer-employee relationship.41 The Appellate Division re-
versed, finding the dispositive factor to be the right of control exer-
cised by the hospital over the functioning of the emergency room, not
the independent contractor status defined in the contract.
42
In dicta, the court noted that even without an employer-employee
relationship the hospital would be liable under an apparent agency
theory because a patient would assume, without contrary notice, that
an emergency room physician was an employee. Patients entering
through an emergency room "are not bound by secret limitations as
are contained in a private contract between the hospital and the doc-
tor."43 Although such service contracts are advocated by some author-
ities as a method of avoiding agency and vicarious liability exposure,44
under Mduba such an instrument may be fatal to the institution. The
contract was treated as evidence of the actual control the hospital had
over the physician, notwithstanding the use of the term "independent
contractor."
B. Apparent Agency and Estoppel to Deny Agency
When a court determines that there is no master-servant relation-
ship and, that respondeat superior therefore cannot be applied, it may
determine that the facts allow recovery based on a theory of "apparent
or ostensible agency" 45 or "estoppel to deny agency."4 6 Although the
"doctrine of apparent agency is steeped in principles of estoppel,"47
apparent agency and estoppel to deny agency are not theoretically
identical. In practice, however, commentators 48 and courts4 9 often use
these terms as if they were interchangeable, causing confusion and
possible misapplication of the law.5 O
Apparent agency is based upon a "holding out" of the ostensible
agent by the ostensible principal such that the reasonable plaintiff
41. Id. at 528, 52 A.D.2d at 452.
42. Id. at 529, 52 A.D.2d at 454.
43. Id. at 529, 52 A.D.2d at 453.
44. Levin, Hospital Liability for Independent Emergency Room Service, 22 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 791, 804 (1982).
45. Southwick, supra note 9, at 10.
46. Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977).
47. Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843, 850 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
48. Southwick, supra note 9, at 10-13.
49. Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843, 850 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
50. See, e.g., infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
HOSPITALS' LIABILITY
would conclude that there existed an agency relationship.51 Estoppel
to deny agency, by contrast, requires that the plaintiffs actual reliance
on the identity of the principal causes or induces the plaintiff to act or
forbear.52 Thus, theoretically, there need be no causal relationship be-
tween the principal's conduct and the plaintiff's reliance to warrant a
conclusion of ostensible agency; such a causal relationship and such a
change of position, however, is the essence of estoppel to deny
agency.
5 3
Yet this important though subtle distinction often is elusive. In
Stewart v. Midani,54 for example, the court recognized that the re-
quired change of position suggests that the estoppel doctrine will gen-
erally be inapplicable in the typical personal injury case:
There are of course instances in which an ostensible agency may be cre-
ated by permitting a person to drive a truck under [certain] conditions, but it
cannot reasonably be contended that a motorist would be more likely to wish
to collide with a truck bearing the insignia of [Texaco] than with one bearing
any other insignia.5 5
Nonetheless, the Stewart court reasoned from the presence of reliance
in similar cases against hospitals that, in the absence of evidence on
the question, "a jury may well conclude that [plaintiff's decedent] re-
lied on the hospital and its apparent agents."G Permitting the fact-
finder to draw such an inference on no evidence dilutes any require-
ment of the change in position caused by the hospital's apparent repre-
sentations that should be the gravamen of an argument based on
estoppel.
Thus, it is difficult at times to discern whether a court is basing its
finding of liability on estoppel, apparent agency, or on respondeat su-
perior. It may be nigh impossible to decide which theory of agency a
court is using to impose liability even when it discusses its rationale at
length.57 Perhaps more regrettable is the perpetuation of error that
occurs when a later court either relies on the precedent of a case that
was incorrectly decided based on its confusion of agency theory, or in-
correctly interprets the language of the former court.
Illustrative of the cases confusing liability under the theory of os-
tensible (or apparent) agency is a recent New Jersey decision, Arthur
v. St. Peters Hospital.58 The court held a hospital liable for the con-
duct of an independent contractor because it found the patient could
reasonably have believed that the contractor was an employee, and the
51. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958).
52. Id. at § 267.
53. Id. at § 8 comment d.
54. 525 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
55. Id. at 851 (citing Duvall v. T.W.A., 98 Cal. App. 2d 106, 219 P.2d 463, 470 (1950)).
56. Id. at 853.
57. Id. at 845-53.
58. 169 N.J. Super. 575, 405 A.2d 443 (1979).
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hospital had done nothing to dispel that belief.5 9
In Arthur, the plaintiff sought treatment for an injured wrist at the
emergency room of the defendant hospital. He was examined and
sent to Radiology for x-rays. He was advised that no fracture existed
and was released. Continuing pain forced him to seek the care of an
outside physician who diagnosed a fracture of the wrist. Plaintiff sued
the physicians and the hospital. The hospital filed an affidavit claim-
ing that the physicians were independent contractors and submitted
proof that no social security or withholding tax deductions were made
from the physicians' receipts. The hospital did bill for the physicians'
charges on hospital stationery, however, and made no attempt to put
patients on notice that the doctors were not hospital employees.60
The court found that the hospital held these doctors out as employ-
ees and might, therefore, be liable for the physicians' negligence. 61
Although there is some language in the opinion suggesting an estoppel
theory,62 the court seemed to be relying more on a theory of ostensible
agency. It speaks, for example, of "holding out."63 What is remarka-
ble, however, as in many other cases, is the court's citation of apparent
agency and estoppel cases 64 with no perceivable distinction drawn
among them.65
In applying apparent agency theory, it is important to note that the
actions to be examined are those of the principal, not the agent. The
test is simply whether the hospital voluntarily placed the independent
contractor in such a position that an ordinarily prudent person would
be justified in assuming that the apparent agent had authority to act in
a particular manner.66 In making a determination of ostensible
agency, courts presume that hospitals are in the business of providing
health care services, that patients frequently depend on hospitals to
provide primary care, and that decisions to admit from an emergency
room are often made by non-employees acting on behalf of the
hospital.67
A leading authority for imposition of liability based on estoppel to
deny agency is MehIman v. Powell.68 The patient was taken by his
59. Id. at 584, 405 A.2d at 447.
60. Id. at 578, 405 A.2d at 444.
61. Id. at 584, 405 A.2d at 447.
62. E.g., id. at 580, 405 A.2d at 446.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., infra note 68.
65. Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 169 N.J. Super 575, 580-81, 405 A.2d 443, 446 (1979).
66. Id.
67. Levin, supra note 44, at 800.
68. 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977). Arthur relied upon the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965), which provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for an-
other which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are
being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability
[Vol. 64:689
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family to the Holy Cross Hospital emergency room, where he was
treated by an emergency room physician who was not an employee of
the hospital. Shortly after his discharge from the emergency room,
Powell died. His family brought suit against the physician and the
hospital. The evidence established that the emergency room was run
not by the hospital but by a group of contract physicians as independ-
ent contractors.69 The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized that the
law theretofore had required a master-servant relationship if vicarious
liability were to be imposed upon the hospital. It found that there was
no master-servant relationship between the hospital and the emer-
gency room doctors.70 But, relying on the Restatement of Agency,71
the court concluded that the hospital nonetheless could be vicariously
liable for the acts of the emergency room doctor.
The hospital had, by its actions, represented that the doctor was its
servant and thereby caused other persons to rely upon the care or skill
of that doctor.7 2 The court noted that from all outward appearances
the hospital's emergency room, where Powell sought treatment, was
an integral part of the hospital itself. There was no reason for Powell
or his family to believe that there was other than a master-servant
relationship between the physician and the hospital. The court found
that:
Holy Cross represented to the decedent that the staff of the. . . emergency
room were its employees, thereby causing the decedent to rely on the skill of
the emergency room staff, and that the Hospital is consequently liable to the
decedent as if the emergency room staff were its employees.7 3
MehIman has sometimes been referred to as an example of appar-
ent agency. The key factor in MehIman, however, was the patient's
change of position in justifiable reliance upon the hospital's implied
representation that it was responsible for the emergency room staff.
It is clear that for liability to be imposed upon an individual or entity
for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in supply-
ing such services, to the same extent as though the employer were sup-
plying them himself or by his servants.
Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 273, 378 A.2d 1121, 1123 (1977), by contrast, was
predicated on the arguably stricter standard of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 267 (1958), which provides:
One who represents that another is his servant or agent and thereby
causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such
apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused
by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other
agent as if he were such.
Typically, Arthur cites Mehlrann without discussion. Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp.,
169 N.J. Super. 575, 582, 405 A.2d 443, 446 (1979).
69. Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 272, 378 A.2d 1121, 1123 (1977).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 273, 378 A.2d at 1123.
72. Id. at 275, 378 A.2d at 1124.
73. Id.
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on the basis of agency by estoppel, there must be actual reliance upon
the part of the person injured.7 4 Absent evidence of reliance upon the
representations of the principal - evidence to support an estoppel -
there can be no vicarious liability imposed upon one who did not per-
form a negligent act. The Mehiman court seems to be saying that a
mere "holding out" of the agent is not sufficient; the plaintiff must
have detrimentally relied on the principal to provide service through
its alleged agent.
In an effort to avoid imposition of liability under this theory, Mehl-
man has caused Maryland hospitals (and perhaps those in other
states) to initiate actions to distance themselves from their independ-
ent contractors and provide notice to patients of the nature of the hos-
pital-physician relationship. Posting of signs, separate billing, notices
in area newspapers, and the like have met with only partial success.
Signs and newspaper notices are of no value to an unconscious, intoxi-
cated, or non-English speaking patient, especially if he enters through
ambulance bay doors. Separate billing may not provide advance notice
unless a sign indicates the fact of and the reason for this practice.
Further, in states that have established mandatory pretrial proce-
dures, such as arbitration or screening, the initial steps and decisions
in the judicial process - where one would expect the hospitals' notice
procedures to be conclusive - present further problems. These steps
and decisions are unreported,75 and often are made by panel chairmen
who lack judicial experience76 and who hesitate to grant motions for
summary judgment or directed verdict. Moreover, because published
opinions are lacking, there is virtually no precedential value in a find-
ing of nonliability based on notice procedures in a previous arbitration.
Another approach taken by hospitals to avoid imposition of liabil-
ity under this theory has been to attack the justifiable or detrimental
reliance prong of estoppel to deny agency. In Mehiman the patient
chose Holy Cross Hospital specifically.77 But, if a patient is brought to
the hospital unconscious by ambulance personnel, not only does he
not know where he is, but he could have made no conscious decision to
enter that particuliar hospital.
Johnson v. Lutheran Hospital,78 was a medical malpractice action
heard before a panel empowered by the Health Claims Arbitration
74. Id. at 273, 378 A.2d at 1123 (citing B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 645, 370
A.2d 554, 560 (1977)).
75. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05 (1984) (no provision for a writ-
ten opinion to issue from the arbitration panel except for a simple notice of award
that is entered on a form; the only information necessary is for whom the judg-
ment was entered and the amount of damages and costs).
76. See id. at § 3-2A-04(b).
77. Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 271, 378 A.2d 1121, 1122 (1977).
78. HCA 82-146.
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Article of the Maryland Annotated Code.79 The claimant was brought
to Lutheran Hospital by ambulance in a highly intoxicated, semi-stu-
porous condition after sustaining injuries when he was thrown from a
second floor porch during a fist fight. Ambulance personnel made the
decision to go to Lutheran Hospital without any request from the
claimant or his family. The claimant was rolled into the emergency
room, treated by independent contractor physicians, and discharged to
his home accompanied by his father. The next day he awoke
quadraplegic.
Arguing an absence of employer-employee relationship between
the hospital and the physician, Lutheran moved for summary judg-
ment,8 0 and later for a directed verdict. Further, Lutheran produced
evidence of stategically placed signs noting the status of the physician
and warning of separate billing due to this status.8 1 The chairman of
the arbitration panel denied these motions. Defense counsel argued
further that the plaintiffs loss of orientation as to place due to intoxi-
cation, and his failure to choose the hospital (in fact, he admitted he
did not know where he was) meant that he could not have detrimen-
tally relied upon any expectation of care from a particular hospital as
had the plaintiff in MehIman. Not only must the physician appear to
be an agent, but, more importantly under MehIman, the claimant
must justifiably rely to his detriment on this appearance of agency.
Nonetheless, these facts did not lead the panel chairman to grant the
motion. Given this ruling, at least in Maryland, the necessity for detri-
mental reliance as a practical matter is unclear. The panel chairman
seemed to apply the rules of apparent agency that arguably do not re-
quire any choice.
It should be noted that confusion abounds not only in the areas of
apparent agency versus estoppel to deny agency, but also between lia-
bility based on agency and respondeat superior.8 2 A few recent cases,
conflating actual and ostensible agency, hold that the proper test is not
the subjective belief of the patient nor the "holding out" by the princi-
pal, but the degree of control exercised by the hospital over the physi-
cian's care. In the absence of control, these courts continue to deny
imposition of vicarious hospital liability for the actions of these con-
tractors on any basis. In Overstreet v. Doctors Hospital,8 3 for example,
the fact that the "hospital reserved no right to control the specific
medical techniques employed by the emergency room doctors, but
merely exercised a limited surveillance in order to monitor the quality
79. See MD. CTs. & JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2-A-01 to -09 (1984).
80. Johnson, HCA 82-146, Motion for Summary Judgment, filed with the Health
Claims Arbitration Office, Sept. 27, 1983.
81. Johnson, HCA 82-146, Defendants Exhibit # 5.
82. See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972).
83. 142 Ga. App. 895, 237 S.E.2d 213 (1977).
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of medical care provided," insulated the hospital from liability.84 The
emergency room physician had a contract with the hospital to provide
emergency room services, to maintain records, and to promulgate
rules and regulations.85 The court found that these physicians were
not employees of the hospital, thus releasing the hospital from liabil-
ity based on respondeat superior. Further obscuring the issue, the
court also found that the hospital did not control the medical actions
of the physicians, thus releasing them from any apparent agency
claim.
Lack of control is usually the rationale given for denying liability
based on respondeat superior, while the existence of a contract or a
"significant relationship"8 6 between the physician and the hospital,
coupled with "holding out" of an agent, could be used to establish ap-
parent agency based on contractual grounds, as the court noted in
Mduba.87 In Rivera v. Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Center,8 8 the trial
court had held that the degree of control exercised by the hospital
determined independent contractor status. The appellate court stated
that a hospital is ordinarily not liable for the acts of its independent
contractors; under certain circumstances, however, such liability could
be imposed. Citing Mduba, the court held that the degree of control
exercised determines whether liability would lie under an agency the-
ory.8 9 In another case, following Overstreet, the Georgia court again
stated that the traditional criterion, control, is the appropriate one to
be used in determining agency.90 Thus, not only are apparent agency
and estoppel to deny agency confused, but even the more basic theo-
ries of respondeat superior and apparent agency easily can be blurred.
C. Corporate Negligence
The hospital is directly liable for its corporate negligence, predi-
84. Id. at 897, 237 S.E.2d at 215. Such surveillance and monitoring might provide a
basis for liability under a corporate negligence theory. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 91-134.
85. Overstreet v. Doctors Hosp., 142 Ga. App. 895, 896, 237 S.E.2d 213, 214 (1977).
86. See Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for
Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REv. 385, 400 (1975).
87. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
88. 70 A.D.2d 794, 417 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1979).
89. Id. at 796, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
90. Allrid v. Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35, 285 S.E.2d 521 (1982). The court stated that:
[Tihe true test of whether the relationship is one of employer-employee
or employer-independent contractor is whether the employer, under a
contract either oral or written, assumes the right to control the time,
manner and method of executing the work as distinguished from the
right merely to require certain definite results in conformity to the
contract.
Id. at 39-40, 285 S.E. 2d at 525-26 (quoting Hodges v. Doctors Hosp., 141 Ga. App.
649, 651, 234 S.E.2d 116, 117 (1977)).
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cated on the breach of a legally defined duty to a patient to assure
adequate provision of equipment and medical services. While provi-
sion of equipment is not often a challenged responsibility,9 1 provision
of medical services continues to be a frequently litigated issue. A fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care in the selection and retention of medi-
cal staff represents the greatest expansion of liability under this
theory.9
2
The degree of control hospitals wield over medical practice is
widely debated. Some hospitals believed that establishment of medi-
cal staff committees composed of independent contractor physicians
insulated the hospital administration from liability under a respondeat
superior theory because the doctors themselves controlled their prac-
tice by peer review.93 Although most cases have held that administra-
tive representation on medical staff committees requires a finding
against the hospital due to that participation,94 non-representation
would constitute corporate negligence because of the Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation's requirements that demand hospital adminis-
trative review of medical care.
95
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,96 was the
landmark case in the emergence of hospital liability for inadequate
medical care provided within corporate boundaries.97 Although it did
not directly impose liability for a hospital's failure in selection and re-
tention of competent medical staff, it is nonetheless cited as the origi-
nal authority for the doctrine of hospitals' corporate negligence. This
doctrine has since expanded far beyond the narrow holding of
Darling.9S
Plaintiff fractured his leg while playing football. He was seen in
Charleston's emergency room by Dr. Alexander, an attending surgeon
who was "on call" for the emergency room.9 9 Alexander instituted
surgical care, placed Darling in a cast, and continued follow-up. In the
following days, Darling began to suffer increasing pain in the affected
91. Perdue, Direct Corporate Liability for Hospitals: A Modern Day Legal Concept of
Liability for Injury Occuring in the Modern Day Hospital, 24 S. TEx. L. J. 773,
789 (1983).
92. See id. at 792-97.
93. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hasp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
94. See Elam v. College Park Hasp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
95. Cf Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200
N.E. 2d 149 (1964), affld, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert den., 383 U.S.
946 (1966).
96. 33 11l. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
97. Soutlhwick, supra note 9, at 29.
98. Id.
99. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 IlM. App. 2d 253, 268, 200
N.E.2d 149, 158 (1964). Community hospitals without full employee specialist
staffs often require attending physicians, as a condition precedent to full admit-
ting privileges, to alternate emergency call in their specialties.
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leg. Various medical steps were taken, all to no avail. Ultimately, the
patient was transferred to another facility where his leg was ampu-
tated below the knee to remedy the gangrenous condition that was by
then threatening his life.100
Dr. Alexander's care was found substandard for several reasons,
yet the court did not base the hospital's liability vicariously on the ac-
tions of this independent physician.101 The nurses, employees of the
hospital, were independently negligent in failing to recognize symp-
toms that were within their powers of observation and should have
prompted them to seek review of the physician's care by other physi-
cians or nurse supervisors. Thus, the hospital was liable for the negli-
gence of its nurses under respondeat superior 02 and the court did not
need to create a new basis for establishing hospital liability to hold
Charleston responsible. Nonetheless, Darling held that the hospital's
failure to review negligent medical care rendered by an independent
contractor physician or to require consultation amounted to direct
negligence of the hospital.o3 Further, Darling established that the
standards contained in a hospital's medical staff bylaws, in addition to
those found in the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAH)04 yearly standards and in state licensing regulations, may de-
termine the applicable standard of care for a hospital to follow in se-
lection and retention of medical staff and are admissible to establish
negligence.105
Darling may have been the high water mark of hospital liability
founded on the duty to supervise the ongoing medical care of patients.
Although its narrow holding of a requirement to supervise ongoing
medical care has not been followed by an appellate court to date, its
impact is not insignificant. Indeed, its impact on hospital practices in-
volving staff selection, evaluation and retention is incalculable. Hospi-
tals that believed incorrectly that they had no direct legal
responsibility to their patients for the quality of care rendered within
their walls were forced to acknowledge such responsibility. 06 It is im-
possible to assess the totality of remedial measures that hospitals may
have undertaken following Darling.O7 While courts may not be fol-
lowing the narrow holding of Darling, the broader theory enunciating
100. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 329, 211 N.E.2d
253 256 (1965).
101. Id. at 339, 211 N.E.2d at 261.
102. Id. at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 331, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
105. Id. at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 258.
106. Interview with David Kennedy, Risk Manager, Easton Memorial Hospital, in Eas-
ton, Md. (July 23, 1984).
107. See Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate Hospital Liability, 17 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 383, 386 n.16 (1980).
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the hospital's corporate and direct responsibility to patients has been
widely expanded. Its impact in the medico-legal field has been analo-
gized to that of Pasgrafo8 in the area of general negligence. 109 Fol-
lowing Darling, several states enacted legislation embodying its
general pronouncement of expanded hospital liability.110 Moreover,
whether Darling was cited or not, soon after that decision the corpo-
rate negligence doctrine was recognized by appellate courts in at least
eight states."'1 It has been suggested that Darling wrought the great-
est change in hospital liability law in the past twenty-five years.112
While the trend is toward broadening corporate liability, the pen-
dulum swing is not complete. In Fiorentio v. Wenger,113 for example,
the court, although finding liability, cautioned that a hospital, to be
held liable for the delict of an independent contractor, must have rea-
son to know the act of malpractice would take place.114 Other courts,
purporting to apply a similar test, have held that hospitals have a duty
to supervise physician competency and quality of care. 15 Thus, for
example, in Fricena v. Evans,"6 the court predicated liability on ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of incompetence. The hospital was
held to have had knowledge of the negligent act and was therefore
liable, although no previous acts of negligence or incompetency were
in evidence. The physician had committed only a single negligent act
that was the basis of the instant claim and the hospital was held to
have knowledge only of this single negligent act. It is noteworthy,
however, that the negligent physician held several administrative po-
sitions within the hospital (as well as part ownership). The court im-
puted to the hospital the knowledge that the tortfeasor-physician had
108. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
109. Springer, Medical Staff Law and the Hospital, 285 NEW ENG. J. MAED. 952, 954
(1971).
110. See Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution - Expanding Responsibility
Changes its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W. L. REv. 429, 445 n.
47-50 and accompanying text (1973).
111. Comment, supra note 107, at 386 n.16. See also Peters, Reallocating Liability to
Medical Staff Review Committee Members: A Response to the Hospital Corporate
Liability Doctrine, 10 AM. J. OF L. & MED. 115, 126 (1984).
112. Elam v. College Park Hosp. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 345-46, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 164
(1982); Slawkowski, supra note 34, at 6.
113. 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967).
114. Id. at 414, 227 N.E.2d at 299, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 378. See also Corleto v. Shore Memo-
rial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975) (staff and board of trustees
could be joined as defendants to a surgeon's malpractice only if they knew or
should have known of his incompetence).
115. Fridena v. Evans, 127 Ariz. 516, 622 P.2d 463 (1980); Tucson Med. Center Inc. v.
Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976). See also Ahrins v. Katz, 164 Ga. App.
729, 297 S.E.2d 108 (1983); Wallace v. Garden City Osteopathic Hosp., 111 Mich.
App. 212, 314 N.W.2d 557 (1981); Porter v. Pandey, 423 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1982).
116. 127 Ariz. 516, 622 P.2d 463 (1980).
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through his administrative capacities. 11 7 In other words, the hospital
administration had instant knowledge of the malpractice because an
administrator-physician committed it.
In Gonzales v. Nork,118 evidence was admitted indicating that the
surgeon had performed about thirty-eight similiar negligent or unnec-
essary operations. The hospital was found to have had no actual
knowledge of the substandard nature of these operations; liability was
based on its lack of an evaluatory mechanism to supervise medical
care. 19 The hospital defended on the ground that its evaluatory
mechanisms were not only in conformity with industry (JCAH) stan-
dards, but went beyond those standards. The California Superior
Court held that a hospital could be held liable despite good faith com-
pliance with industry standards.120 The court found that the hospital's
liability was not strict, but that the hospital had a duty to acquire and
use information about risk creating activities.12 '
Although Darling was based on the hospital's failure to review
ongoing medical care, rather than on a negligent granting of staff priv-
ileges theory,122 many cases do recognize a duty to use due care in
selecting staff members.12 3 In Johnson v. Misericordia Community
Hospital,124 for example, the court held that a hospital must exercise
that degree of care in selecting its staff as would be exercised by an
average hospital.125 The defendant surgeon had been granted privi-
leges to practice without proper investigation of references, previous
117. Id. at 519, 622 P.2d at 466.
118. No. 228566 (Super. Ct. Cal., Sacramento County, filed Nov. 19, 1973), cited in
Kahn, Hospital Malpractice Prevention, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 23, 32-34 (1977).
119. Kahn, supra note 118, at 32.
120. Id. at 33.
121. Id. at 34.
122. See, e.g. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Mitchell
County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Corleto v. Shore
Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975).
123. See, e.g., Tucson Med. Center Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976);
Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Holton
v. Resurrection Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 665, 410 N.E.2d 969 (1980); Hannola v. City
of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 156 (1981).
124. 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
125. Id. at 731, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981). But see W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 187 (5th ed. 1984). The Johnson court delineated the four princi-
pal elements of the theory of corporate negligence: 1) the existence of a duty on
the part of the hospital to exercise reasonable care in the selection of its medical
staff-a question of law, not fact; 2) a breach of the standard of care required of a
hospital under similar circumstances-a question of fact; 3) causation-a question
of fact; and 4) damages or injury. In short, the same elements needed to establish
any negligence action. Id at 179. Also noteworthy is the intermediate court of
appeals' view, left undisturbed by the supreme court, that the hospital's corporate
negligent act need only be a substantial factor in the plaintiff's injury and not a
sole or even primary factor. Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 97 Wis.
2d 521, 560, 294 N.W.2d 501, 520-21 (1980).
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staff appointments, or the current status of his malpractice record,
conveniently left incomplete on his application.12 6 Soon after his priv-
ileges were initally granted he was made Chief of Staff. The court
found that the hospital did not follow even minimum requirements for
establishing the suitability and qualifications of this physician. Hospi-
tals must evidence good faith and reasonable care in making staff ap-
pointments and retaining physicians once privileges are granted.327
Similarly, the defendant hospital in Elam v. College Park Hospi-
tal,328 was held liable for negligently conducting peer review. There
were no negligent or incompetent practices on the part of the physi-
cian while at College Park Hospital before the incident forming the
basis of the action. The court found the practices of the peer review
committee negligent because the committee did not report to the hos-
pital administration the filing of a malpractice suit against the physi-
cian. The suit had been filed after the physician was granted
privileges at College Park Hospital and arose from care rendered at
another hospital prior to his association with College Park. The peer
review committee had obtained knowledge of this suit four and one-
half months prior to the Elam surgery, during its periodic review of
the physician's credentials, and did not report it to the hospital admin-
istration. 2 9 The committee checked available credentials prior to
granting privileges and monitored the physician's care according to
hospital policies. It found no apparent deviations from the standard of
care at this hospital until the time of the incident that gave rise to
Elam's claim. Yet, Elam has been cited as an enlightened example of
the proper application of law of corporate negligence.130
By contrast, in Ferguson v. Gonyaw,13' the court held that the hos-
pital's failure to check the doctor's credentials did not establish negli-
gence where no evidence was presented showing the hospital would
have denied privileges if it had done so. Pickle v. Curns,132 held a hos-
pital not liable for a breach of its corporate duty to select and review
medical care absent evidence that it knew the doctor would not follow
hospital policies. The court noted that a hospital has no duty to insure
that an attending physician will never commit malpractice.13 3 It is
126. Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 714, 301 N.W.2d 156,
159 (1981).
127. See Elam v. College Park Hasp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982);
Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307, affd, 229
Ga. 140,189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp.,
88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605, cert den., 409 U.S. 879 (1972).
128. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
129. Id. at 336, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
130. Southwick, supra note 9, at 41.
131. 64 Mich. App. 685, 236 N.W.2d 543 (1975).
132. 106 IM. App. 3d 734, 435 N.E.2d 877 (1982).
133. Id. at 739, 435 N.E.2d at 881.
1985]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
noteworthy that this case was decided in the same jurisdiction that
decided Darling, but did not hold that the hospital had a duty to super-
vise ongoing medical treatment.134
IV. DUTY OF THE HOSPITAL
A. General Considerations
Physicians have long been suspected of "conspiring by silence" to
protect inadequate care rendered by their peers.135 Critical expert tes-
timony has been difficult for plaintiffs to obtain in medical malprac-
tice suits.13 6 Few physicians are reported by peers to the Medical
Board's Disciplinary Committee for even egregious standard of care
infractions. 3 7 State licensing establishes minimum levels of compe-
tency, but provides no systematic review of ongoing medical care.138
Notice of malpractice judgments and awards made against individual
physicians often are not disseminated, requiring hospitals to bear a
heavier burden of monitoring and responsibility for the care provided
by the physicians to whom it grants privileges. The expansion of hos-
pitals' liability for physicians' malpractice represents the contributions
of many courts to the hospital's mandate to take responsibility for the
quality of health care. Additionally, governmental agencies, legisla-
tures, and the public increasingly ascribe to the hospital the final re-
sponsibility for the quality of health care.139 Whether the realities of
medical practice make this approach viable remains problematic.140
Complicated systems of regulation have been developed within
which the hospital operates. Capital equipment and facilities cannot
be purchased or built without a certificate of need from a Regional
Health Services Agency.141 Reimbursements for hospital services are
134. Perdue, supra note 91, at 810. See supra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
135. See Graham v. Sisco, 248 Ark. 6, 11, 449 S.W.2d 949, 951 (1970); Note Overcoming
the "Conspiracy of Silence": Statutory and Common Law Innovations, 45 MINN.
L. REv. 1019 (1961). But cf Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118
(1959) (unsuccessful conspiracy action against local medical society based on al-
leged pressure it exerted on a physician not to testify for the plaintiff).
136. W. KEETON, supra note 125, at 188.
137. S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT. THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 41-46
(1978). For a general discussion of the problems of licensure, disciplinary review
procedures, and interstate reporting mechanisms, see F. GRAD & N. MARTE, PHY-
sICIANS' LICENsuRE AND DIsCIPLINE (1979).
138. F. GRAD & N. MARTE, supra note 137, at 70-71.
139. See Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Status, 1 Am.
J. L. Mmn. 245 (1975).
140. See generally Slawkowski, supra note 34.
141. SALKEvER & BICE, supra note 17, at 5-6. A certificate of need (CON) is required
when a covered agency (such as a hospital, nursing home, outpatient clinic, etc.)
desires to make a capital expenditure to change the physical plant or to purchase
equipment or expand services. For a detailed discussion of CON's, see JOsKOW,
supra note 16, at 76.
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made by Medicare or private third party payors according to estab-
lished formulae. 42 Retrospective denial of payment can be made if a
hospital's quality assurance protocols do not pass muster in a given
case.'
4 3
Hospitals are required by state agencies to comply with procedures
to ascertain currency of licensure by their employees and agents.144
JCAH standards cover all major functions of the modern hospital.145
In addition to JCAH regulations, state licensing regulations, PSRO
and Medicare requirements, among others, must be met.146
The hospital is no stranger to bureaucratic conflict. Hospitals may
be cited by state licensing agencies for physical plant defects remedia-
ble only by capital improvements that the local health care services
agency denies for inability to prove certifiable area need.147 It appears
that hospitals may be caught between the bureaucratic Scylla of physi-
cal plant requirements and the equally bureaucratic Charybdis of re-
fusal of the funding agencies. Nor is this the only example of
conflicting demands on the modern hospital.14
8
B. State Licensing
In the past, hospitals had no control over medical practice. The
state had little, and the courts less. The medical profession was
largely self-regulating. This self-regulation proved unsatisfactory and
states began to enact medical and nursing practice acts that required
licensing of practitioners.149 New practitioners had to submit to exam-
ination, but those already in practice at the statute's inception were
142. See supra note 18.
143. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320c-1
to 1320c-11 (1974).
144. Holbrook & Dunn, Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Discoverability and Use
of Hospitals' Quality Assurance Committee Records, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 54, 58
(1976).
145. See supra note 7.
146. See Holbrook & Dunn, supra note 144, at 58.
147. For example, in 1978 a hospital in rural New Jersey was cited by the State licens-
ing authority for a number of violations in its labor and delivery suite. Specifi-
cally, separate bathroom facilities were required for nurses and patients; an
additional delivery room was necessary because of the conversion of an existing
delivery room into a "birthing room" (one in which patients labor, deliver and
recover); and a larger on-call sleeping facility for physicians was needed. To meet
these demands would have required the hospital to initiate renovations that
would have cost more than $150,000, which, in turn, required a CON. The Re-
gional Health Services Agency denied the request for CON because the number
of deliveries (below 1,000 per year) did not warrant a new construction or renova-
tion. One of the authors (Janulis) was the nursing care coordinator of the obstet-
rical unit of the hospital at the time.
148. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 181-206.
149. F. GRAD & N. MARTE, supra note 137, at 2.
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"grandfathered" in.'5 0 States have been slow to update their practice
acts to reflect the changing state of health care practice.151 Moreover,
these statutes require only minimum levels of competence, and often
require no upgrading and reevaluation after the initial license is
issued.15
2
Injured patients were stymied in their attempts to recover for al-
leged negligent practice due to their inability to get expert medical
testimony crucial to establishing the applicable standard of care and
its breach.15 3 Physicians were not only unwilling to regulate them-
selves by peer review, but also unwilling to testify against their col-
leagues. Fortunately this "conspiracy of silence" is much less
prevalent today than it once was.1 54 Individual civil actions, however,
cannot be expected to police adequately the quality of medical
practice.
Medical societies and state medical boards have established disci-
plinary commissions whose role is to review reported cases of physi-
cian malpractice and misconduct.15s Yet little action is taken by these
boards.156 They function-like courts--only retrospectively and in
specific cases. More importantly-and again like courts-they rely on
reporting from the public and other health care providers. A com-
puter service linking one state to another is available for dissemina-
tion of information of disciplinary actions taken by member states.157
Although membership is not mandatory, all states are voluntary mem-
bers of the service. The speed and comprehensiveness of reporting,
however, depends upon the resources of each state.158
As a result of these inadequacies it may be necessary for hospitals
to investigate the competence of physicians despite state licensure. In
Joiner v. Mitchell County Hospital Authority, 59 the Georgia Supreme
Court concluded that a hospital might incur liability if it grants privi-
leges to an incompetent physician despite its reliance on the state's
licensure process as an assurance of competency.160 Further, the hos-
150. Interview with Hilda Stevan, Executive Director, Md. State Bd. of Med. Examin-
ers (July 19, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Stevan Interview].
151. The result of this tardiness is that practitioners may be routinely practicing in
violation of the relevant statute. Medical practice changes rapidly with changing
technology, and many tasks formerly part of medical practice may be delegated to
para-professionals without preceding changes in medical practice acts.
152. The trend is to require a specified number of hours of continuing professional
education for relicensure. See F. GRAD & N. MARTE, supra note 137, at 56.
153. See, e.g., supra notes 135-36.
154. Id.
155. F. GRAD & N. MARTE, supra note 137, at 112.
156. S. LAw & S. POLAN, supra note 137, at 31.
157. Stevan Interview, supra note 150.
158. Id.
159. 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972).
160. Id.
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pital could not avoid liability by delegating this reponsibility to a medi-
cal staff committee composed solely of physicians.161 All
appointments made by the committee were to be imputed to the
hospital.
In a malpractice action the physician is held to the level of the rea-
sonable, prudent, and similarly skilled physician in similar circum-
stances.1 62 Because this level is higher than the minimal level of
competence required to obtain a license to practice, a hospital must
require more from a physician than a license prior to granting him
privileges. The hospital's mandate to review medical practice may be
viewed as an analogue to state licensing. Its function of insuring the
competence of practitioners parallels the governmental function.
However, because the medical review committee operates at an insti-
tutional level, it has a better opportunity to supervise, review, and
evaluate medical care than does the state agency. Thus the hospital
may be better able to protect the public.163 Plainly, not all licensed
physicians consistently practice in accordance with acceptable stan-
dards of care as defined by expert medical witnesses. If hospitals are
to be held responsible for this higher level of competence, they must
seek it in their staff physicians. 64
Yet the opinions in cases in which physicians challenge denial or
termination of privileges sometimes suggest that hospitals have no
need to exclude licensed physicians from privileges to practice.
Although most cases are finally decided on the adequacy of the hospi-
tal's fair notice and hearing procedures, 65 occasionally an opinion
may declare that there is no necessity to go beyond documentation of
state licensure to practice medicine. As one judge observed:
This resolution does not create a risk that a hospital will be liable for the
negligence of its physicians, yet lack the capacity to exclude them. With the
possible exception of one decision courts have always held that a hospital is
not liable for the negligent acts of the physicians who are not employed by the
hospital. The ordinary physician is not the hospital's "servant" because the
hospital has no "right to control" the acts of an "independent contractor."
Since the hospital is not liable for the independent physician's negligence, it
has no need to guarantee that he is competent.
The danger that the hospital's admission of a physician to its staff will en-
courage patients to seek the services of a doctor who may be incompetent is
also chimeral [sic]. Patients are admitted to hospitals only after they have
chosen a doctor. Even in emergency rooms, patients are treated by doctors in
161. Id.
162. See generally W. KEETON, supra note 125, at 186; Southwick, supra note 9.
163. Hall, supra note 27, at 246-47.
164. For an innovative suggestion for imposition of accountability for review of medi-
cal care, see Peters, supra note 111.
165. See Hirsh, A Fish Without Water Hospital Administration Privileges, 84 CASE &
CoM., No. 4 July-Aug. 18 (1979). See also Comment, Hospital Medical Staff Privi-
leges: Recent Developments in Procedural Due Process, 12 WILAMs'rE L.J. 137,
139-150 (1975-1976).
1985]
712 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:689
the employ of the hospital, or by a physician of their own choosing.
1 6 6
Hospitals should not be compelled to open their doors to any physician
or other licensed practitioner solely on a showing of a license to prac-
tice in that jurisdiction. If hospitals must comply with JCAH and judi-
cially determined medical care standards, they must have the right to
determine the quality of medical care and the number of practitioners
rendering it. Privileges should be more difficult, not easier, to obtain.
C. Protection Against Discovery
The hospital has a non-delegable legal duty to its patients to assure
the quality of medical care and services provided by its employees and
professional staff. Joint Commission accreditation, although volunta-
rily sought, greatly enhances the standing of a hospital. The Federal
Medical Act of 1965167 strengthened the Commission's status by re-
quiring that before the government, as a third party payor, would pay
benefits for services rendered a hospital must be in substantial compli-
ance with federal standards or have Joint Commission
accreditation.
68
Commission requirements mandate that hospitals develop a com-
plex system of medical staff review committees to control and monitor
the quality of their medical care. The findings and records of these
committees could be of immense value to the parties in a malpractice
action, especially if liability is being predicated on a theory of corpo-
rate negligence. Many states, however, have passed statutes prevent-
ing discovery of the proceedings, files, and minutes of these
committees. These statutes also provide personal immunity from lia-
bility for defamation for the members of the committee. The type of
privilege and the scope of protection varies among jurisdictions.16
9
Most jurisdictions have recognized a conditional or qualified privilege,
abrogated by a finding of "malice," in the areas of medical staff ap-
pointments and evaluation of professional medical competence.17
0
Few jurisdictions provide an absolute privilege--one not destroyed by
malice.17' Those states that have enacted statutes providing some
form of immunity to participants in peer review and hospital commit-
tees generally have codified the qualified privileges recognized by
their courts.1
72
The dilemma is obvious: the very records most valuable to prove
166. Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Haw. 475, 489-90, 497 P.2d 564, 573-74 (1972)
(Abe, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
167. Health Insurance for Aged and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1395xx (1965).
168. Id. at § 1395bb (1972).
169. Holbrook & Dunn, supra note 144, at 74.
170. Hall, supra note 27, at 255.
171. Id. at 258.
172. Id. at 262.
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the adequacy or reasonableness of the hospital's corporate actions may
be shielded statutorily from discovery. One legitimately might in-
quire, in those jurisdictions whose courts have adopted liability based
on corporate negligence, but whose legislatures have passed shielding
statutes, what is the true public mandate.
1. Federal Protection
The Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO) sec-
tions 73 of the Social Security Act provide immunity for physicians
and hospitals reviewing the medical care reimbursed by Medicare and
Medicaid program within the scope of the statute. This review,
although federally mandated, is provided by community-based, local
PSRO's staffed by private physicians. These community organizations
insure that federal funds expended through these programs are solely
for medically necessary services.' 74 Individual physicians may be re-
quired to provide information on the extent of payments they have
received through the programs, and may be asked to justify the serv-
ices rendered. If a physician is suspected of inflating his billings, other
physicians may review the necessity and adequacy of the care pro-
vided. In the absence of malice, individuals who provide relevant in-
formation or services to the PSRO are immune from liability.75
PSRO qualified immunity applies only to the review of medical care
undertaken to determine the suitability of reimbursement under the
Social Security Act.1
7 6
173. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320c-1
to 1320c-11 (1974).
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 182
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7, amended the federal quality assurance program
by replacing the PSRO program with a similar program - the PRO. The PRO is
to function similarly to the PSRO's, which will be gradually phased out. During
the phase-out period, the PSRO requirement will remain in force.
As of mid-1983 no federal regulation had yet been issued for PRO's. One sig-
nificant change between PRO's and PSRO's is that PRO's are not to be consid-
ered federal agencies, thus precluding litigative attempts to obtain privileged
quality assurance information under the Freedom of Information Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320 c-9, as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-248 (1982). The courts had been in con-
flict over these "end-runs" around statutory restriction of information. Another
substantial change is that PRO's must review only Medicare services, but may
review State Medicaid services. Under the PSRO's both Medicare and Medicaid
were reviewed. HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Medical Staff § 8-3 (Sept. 1983) at 91.
174. AMERIcAN ENRPRisE INsTITUTE, PROPOSAL FOR REGULATION OF HOSPITAL
CosTs, 1978.
175. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-6
(1974). Butcf Hackethal v. Weissbein, 147 Cal. Rptr. 284,286 (1978), rev'd, 24 Cal.
3d 55, 529 P.2d 1175, 154 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1979), which held originally that an abso-
lute privilege extended to physician members even if the testimony or participa-
tion were motivated by malice.
176. Hall, supra note 27, at 264.
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Federal law provides other protections as well. Federal legislation,
such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, may preclude discovery of min-
utes and reports of committees inquiring into hospital procedures and
professional conduct of hospital personnel.177 Bredice v. Doctors Hos-
pital,s78 the leading case applying the federal common law of privi-
lege,179 denied access to medical review committee minutes in a
wrongful death case, holding that confidentiality was essential to the
improvement of patient care, and that to require disclosure of these
deliberations would lead to their eventual extinction. 8 0
2. Shielding Statutes
Many states have passed shielding statutes to provide a privilege
for the files, minutes, and decisions of the medical review committees
that evaluate credentials, take disciplinary actions, and evaluate medi-
cal care rendered by staff physicians.' 81 Absent malice, personal im-
munity may extend to the committee members.182 The purpose of
these statutes is to promote frank, unfettered discussion and to main-
tain and improve health care. Shielding statutes are important in im-
posing limits on discoverability and admissibility of such matters as
the committees consider. These statutes are also important because
they appear to give powerful advantage to potential malpractice de-
fendants by shielding deliberations of the hospital that might be used
to prove negligence.
The arguments against discovery and admissibility of committee
proceedings are founded on the public policy that the records are cre-
ated only to improve medical care and that this function will be se-
verely undermined if the records can be subpoenaed in civil actions. It
is thought that colleagues will not offer candid or critical opinions
about each other if they fear such statements will be used as evidence
in a subsequent malpractice trial.183 Conversely, in restricting discov-
ery, it is feared that the interests of the litigant and of justice will not
be served.'8 4
While many states have enacted statutes shielding such records
177. Gilhmann v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
178. 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970).
179. FED. R. EVID. 501.
180. Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 51 F.R.D. 187, 188 (D.D.C. 1970).
181. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 39-19a (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1768 (1974); MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 14-201, 14-602 (1981).
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.065(2) (Supp. 1977); MD. HEALTH Occ. CODE ANN. § 14-
603 (1981).
183. Holbrook & Dunn, supra note 144, at 63-64.
184. Id. at 64. See Bernstein, Access to Physician's Hospital Records, 45 J. AM. Hosp.
Assoc. 148 (1971) (suggesting that protection of confidentiality outweighs the in-
terests of the litigant).
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from discovery, the extent of protection varies.1 8 5 Most statutes pro-
tect only medical staff committee activities,1 8 6 but some are suffi-
ciently comprehensive to protect other hospital review committees.
1 8 7
It is important to distinguish between litigation involving a physi-
cian's negligence and that involving the hospital's negligence when
discussing the impact of these statutes.18 8 If corporate negligence is
alleged, founded on the inadequacy of the review committee system,
then the very issue in contention is the adequacy of the system. It
would seem that the records evidencing its adequacy should be admis-
sible. Nevertheless, two cases to consider this argument have held the
records privileged.
In Matchett v. Petway,1 8 9 plaintiff alleged corporate negligence
predicated on the negligent granting of privileges to the defendant
physician and sought discovery of relevant hospital records. The court
denied this request, stating that these records were immune from dis-
covery and that the statute represented a legislative choice between
conflicting public policy concerns, despite plaintiff's argument that an
exception to the California Evidence Code rendered the immunity in-
operative. o9 0 The petitioner had specifically argued that the portion of
the code that declared "the prohibition relating to discovery or testi-
mony shall not apply.., to any person requesting hospital staff privi-
leges.. ." made the immunity inapplicable in a lawsuit charging the
hospital with negligent selection or retention of "any person request-
ing hospital staff privileges."1
91
In Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital,192 plaintiff, having
suffered sciatic nerve injury during a hysterectomy, had alleged that
the hospital should have suspended the surgeon's privileges due to in-
competence. The court, citing Bredice,19 3 sustained defendant's mo-
tion in limine to prevent plaintiff from introducing hospital records
showing that the surgeon's staff privileges had been restricted in prior
years.
194
185. See HosprrAL LAW MANUAL, Medical Records, at 77-100 (1973) (Attorney's Vol.
HA) (state by state analysis). See also Jacobs & Weagley, The Liability Myth
Exposed. Hospital Review Activities Pose No Risk, Performance Evaluation Pro-
cedure for Auditing and Improving Patient Care, JHC (1975).
186. HosPrrAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 185, at 72.
187. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:7 & 13:3715.3; MnJN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.61 to
145.65.
188. Hall, supra note 27, at 280-81.
189. 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974).
190. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West 1968).
191. Matchett v. Petway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 625, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 318 (1974).
192. 191 Neb. 224, 214 N.W.2d 490 (1974).
193. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
194. Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 191 Neb. 224, 226, 214, N.W.2d 490, 492
(1974).
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Not all jurisidictions construe the privilege so broadly.195 In
Matviuw v. Johnson,196 for example, a physician brought a defamation
action against a colleague who had spoken against him in a peer re-
view committee meeting that led to revocation of the plaintiff's privi-
leges. Plaintiff was permitted to gain access to the minutes of the
meeting. The court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to
grant an absolute immunity it would have done so specifically.1 97
The Washington Supreme Court recently interpreted its shield
statute very broadly in Coburn v. Seda.1 98 Although the statute
seemed to shield these records only in civil actions between health
care providers,19 9 the court held the statute's purpose was to prevent
any opposing party from using a hospital's careful self-assessment to
his advantage in any civil action, including medical malpractice. In
Coburn, the trial court had ordered production of any reports of com-
mittees pertaining to the death of plaintiff's spouse during a cardiac
catheterization.200 The Washington Supreme Court reversed.201
Even more recently, in Anderson v. Breda,20 2 the same court re-
treated from its position in Coburn, characterizing that case as holding
merely that disclosure would be denied if it would interfere with the
statutory purpose.203 In Anderson, the plaintiff sought to discover
whether the defendant physician's hospital privileges had been re-
voked, suspended, or terminated as a result of review committee pro-
ceedings. The court distinguished the results of review committee
proceedings from the records of the proceedings themselves, holding
the former, like other evidence generated or recorded outside the
committee, to be without the protection of the privilege.204
Because recognition of a privilege or immunity impedes discovery,
courts may be reluctant to deny access to these records absent specific
statutes. Seeking to make its intent abundantly clear, the Maryland
legislature, in its 1982 session, amended § 4-601 of the Health Occupa-
tions Article specifically to shield the records, files, and memoranda of
medical review committees from discovery by a medical malpractice
plaintiff.205 The legislature thus codified dicta in Unnamed Physician
195. See Hall, supra note 27 (reviewing cases both compelling and denying discovery);
Holbrook & Dunn, supra note 144.
196. 70 Ill. App. 3d 481, 388 N.E.2d 795 (1979).
197. Id. at 487, 388 N.E.2d at 800.
198. 101 Wash. 2d 270, 677 P.2d 173 (1984).
199. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.250 (1962).
200. Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wash. 2d 270, 677 P.2d 173 (1984).
201. Id.
202. 103 Wash. 2d 901, 700 P.2d 737 (1985).
203. Id., citing Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wash. 2d 270, 677 P.2d 173 (1984).
204. Id.
205. MD. HEALTH Occ. CODE ANN. § 14-601 (Supp. 1982).
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v. Commission on Medical Discipline.206 The court had stated that
the former statute did not prevent discovery of the hospital's discipli-
nary records on a physician in the physician's action against the hospi-
tal for unfair denial of privileges. Instead, the court found the intent
of the statute was to protect such records from discovery by a person
such as a medical malpractice plaintiff.207 Thus, the purpose of the
amendment was not to limit but to clarify that at least one class of
plaintiffs was to be denied access to these records.
As is true of all claims of privilege, two valuable public policy con-
cerns are in conflict: broad discovery of all relevant facts, and the ne-
cessity for confidentiality of the frank deliberations on the quality of
care rendered within an institution. The 1982 action by the Maryland
legislature in codifying the immunity from discovery for medical re-
view committee proceedings might evidence a legislative choice be-
tween these conflicting concerns similar to that noted in Matchett.208
These statutes do not prevent discovery of facts or outside documents
considered by the committees, as is sometimes mistakenly contended;
those are discoverable through other sources. What is protected are
those documents generated by and for the committee during its review
and deliberations.
Even in the absence of privilege, because the standards set by a
hospital to determine adequacy of care and professional behavior
might be significantly higher than those set by courts to determine
negligence, a review committee disciplinary action or denial or revoca-
tion of privileges might be unduly prejudicial - given more weight
than it deserves - in a negligence case tried to a jury.
209
V. CONCLUSION
The ability of or extent to which hospitals are capable of control-
ling or policing medical care is problematic. Any contention that they
control minute-to-minute or even day-to-day medical care has no basis
in reality. Hospital administrators are without power to change or,
generally, even to delay the care ordered by a physician. Frequently,
because medical care must be ordered and carried out immediately,
prospective review of orders, even if possible, would be detrimental to
the health of the patient. Where there are several equally acceptable
methods of treatment, a hospital may not select the one to be used.21 0
Hospitals are not allotted, nor can they generate funds sufficient
for pervasive monitoring and timely review of medical care within
206. 285 Md. 1, 400 A.2d 396 (1979).
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
209. FED. R. EviD. 403.
210. See Toth v. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 22 N.Y.2d 255, 239 N.E.2d 368, 292
N.Y.S.2d 440 (1968).
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their walls. Moreover, given society's current emphasis on hospital
cost-containment,2 1' such funds are not likely to be forthcoming.
Thus, to the extent liability on a theory of respondeat superior is pre-
mised on the hospital's ability to control physicians, it is inappropriate
to the realities of the hospital-physician relationship.
Liability predicated on estoppel to deny agency is not found when
the doctor-patient relationship is established outside the hospital.
Typically, such liability exists when a patient first encounters the phy-
sician after admission on the theory that the reasonable patient would
believe that this physician is the hospital's agent.2 12 Patients appar-
ently have no affirmative obligation to inquire; releases signed by pa-
tients outlining these relationships are often worthless, and
strategically posted signs may also be legally ineffectual.
2 13
If hospitals attempt to limit the control they wield by contractual
means these instruments may be struck down. They may be used as
evidence of a contractual relationship or as evidence of institutional
negligence under regulatory mandate. Even more ironic is the fact
that hospitals established contracts for service with physicians to staff
twenty-four hour departments in order to meet the requirements of
governmental and private regulators.
Perhaps a solution might be to require all physicians to be employ-
ees, permitting the hospital to exercise maximal control. This "solu-
tion" was the basis of a since disbanded experiment in health care
delivery in rural New Jersey.2 14 In the early 1950's the Hunterdon
experiment commenced, requiring all specialist staff to be hospital
employees as a predicate to the granting of privileges. All specialists
were housed in a Diagnostic Center physically adjacent to the hospital.
Only family practitioners were allowed to practice "off campus." All
referrals were made through these family practitioners to center spe-
cialists. Maximal control was achieved by the hospital administration.
The experiment ended when the system was splintered by legal action
of the specialists claiming "restraint of trade."21 5
There may be an unspoken "public policy" reason for expansion of
hospital liability. Bluntly stated, plaintiffs would have greater mone-
tary recoveries if hospitals were found to be joint tortfeasors with the
defendant physician. This is especially true in cases in which the
award exceeded the physician's liability coverage and the physician's
211. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985, § 4, at 3.
212. Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 169 N.J. Super. 575, 584, 405 A.2d 443, 447 (1979).
213. See Johnson v. Lutheran, HCA 82-146 (Md. Health Claims Arb. 1984).
214. See generally H. CURRY, TWENTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY MEDICINE: A
HUNTERDON MEDICAL CENTER SYMPOSIUM (1974); R. TRUSSEL, HUNTERDON MED-
ICAL CENTER: THE STORY OF ONE APPROACH TO RURAL MEDICAL CARE (1956).
215. Interview with Doris Edwards, Vice-President for Patient Services, Hunterdon
Med. Center (July 22, 1984).
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personal assets were shielded by various financial arrangements. If
the hospital were not held liable, the plaintiff could recover only up to
the physician's policy limits. If, however, the hospital were found lia-
ble, its policy limits would be added to the amount available for recov-
ery, greatly increasing plaintiff's final monetary award.
Another advantage to the plaintiff is the tendency of juries to find
liability against institutional defendants more easily than against indi-
viduals.216 Thus, the expansion of liability may be little more than an
attempt to find a deeper and less sympathetic pocket from which the
plaintiff may recover. The court in Adamski v. Tacoma General Hos-
pital,217 hinted at this, stating that the application of hornbook rules
of agency in hospital-physician relationships led to such unsatisfactory
results, from the standpoint of the injured plaintiff, that a substantial
body of special law has been emerging in this area.
The expansion of hospital liability may also be an expression of the
frustration of the public in its dealing with the health care system.
Patients are often inconvenienced when they are required to wait for
long periods of time in hospital emergency rooms and doctor's waiting
areas. Hospitals and doctors do not ordinarily advertise their service
costs and many patients are unpleasantly surprised by the final cost of
the services they undergo.
There is some indication that malpractice awards may, in some
cases, be motivated by sympathy. This may be especially true with
awards against institutional providers who may be expected to have
some type of liability insurance. Recently, there have been stirrings
about the establishment of a kind of no-fault insurance reimburse-
ment system for the victims of malpractice.2 1 8 Transactional costs
could be kept to a minimum if such a system were established. Inves-
tigation of claims to separate the victims of malpractice from those
who suffered "poor results" would be mandatory. The deterrence fac-
tor found in fault-based liability might, however, be lost.219
Under prevailing theories of liability hospitals are not yet strictly
liable for malpractice by physicians. Yet certain trends are evident:
hospitals' liability for negligence occurring within their walls is ex-
panding; hospital services are becoming more specialized and deper-
sonalized; malpractice litigation is flourishing; and health care
consumers and providers wish to open privileges to greater numbers
and types of practitioners. At the center of these sometimes conflict-
ing trends lies the hospital. At least one commentator believes that
216. Cf W. WAGNER, ART OF ADVOCACY, JURY SELECTION § 1.07[8] (1981) (discussing
the difficulty of getting over the hurdle of the impression of many potential ju-
rors that physicians can do no wrong).
217. 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978).
218. S. LAW & S. PoUN, supra note 137, at 149-57.
219. Id. at 155.
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the courts are slowly establishing an "enterprise tort," which would
impose hospital liability for any tort occurring as part of the "hospital
enterprise."
220
Another means to the same end is that taken by Schagrin v. Wil-
mington Medical Center,22 ' which described as a non-delegable duty
the establishment of emergency services as part of the hospital enter-
prise. Hospitals cannot escape liability for torts of independent con-
tractors who are performing a non-delegable duty. Indeed, the label
"non-delegable duty" is merely a question-begging device used to im-
pose liability which may or may not be independently justified. It
would follow that notice, billing, or contractual disclaimers would
have no mitigating effect on such liability. At the core of such enter-
prise liability, of course, is the failure of the hospital itself to fulfill its
duty to those within its walls.
Hospitals seem to be in a vortex of sometimes conflicting regula-
tions and demands. They are required by courts to assure the quality
of physician practice without being given, in some cases, the right to
refuse privileges to a physician who is state licensed. They are re-
quired by one state agency to improve facilities to maintain licensure,
yet denied the certificate for construction by another state agency.
They are advised to execute service contracts with physicians to insu-
late themselves from liability, only to find that this very instrument
may create the liability. Patients want to be able to have the physician
of their choice render professional services in any hospital they may
choose to enter; yet they demand that the hospital, which may be an
unwilling host to the physician, assume full responsbility for the qual-
ity of his care.
Hospitals may or may not be able to satisfy all these demands.
What is unclear is whether the public will be well served by their ef-
fort. Also, unclear, in the face of conflicting messages from courts and
legislatures, is the strength of the mandate to regulate and assure
quality medical care. What is clear is that the cost in terms of money
and human effort will be dear. Serious investigation of the true man-
date for hospitals in today's litigious and regulated society must be un-
dertaken to enable the hospital to clarify the role it is being asked to
assume.
220. Comment, supra note 107, at 385. "Hospital enterprise" is defined as any service,
medical or otherwise, the hospital purports to provide the patient. Id. at 418.
Presumably, this would include coffee shop, gift shop, and barber service.
221. 304 A.2d 61 (Del. 1973).
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